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The Court has asked the parties to address whether the particular procedural
violations alleged by Thomas Robins (“Robins”) entail a degree of risk sufficient
to meet the concreteness requirement for Article III standing. The answer is “yes”:
Robins alleges that Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) committed significant and repeated
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”) procedural requirements
that led to dissemination of inaccurate information about important aspects of his
profile, including his age, educational background, employment history, wealth
level, and marital status. These allegations, which go to the heart of the concern
that motivated Congress to enact the FCRA, easily meet Article III’s concreteness
requirement. The Court also asked whether any other issues remain outstanding in
this appeal and what action this court should take with respect thereto. The answer
to that question is “no.” Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing this action and remand the
case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I.

The Complaint
The FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., imposes “a comprehensive series of

restrictions on the disclosure and use of credit information assembled by consumer
reporting agencies.” FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 989 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). Robins alleges that Spokeo violated Section 1681e(b), which required

1
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the consumer reporting agency to “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” when it prepared a report about him. Plausibly
alleging that Spokeo violated this provision, Robins brought this action under
Section 1681n, which authorizes a private suit by a consumer against “[a]ny person
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter
with respect to [that] consumer.”1
“In order to make out a prima facie violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer
must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a
report containing inaccurate information.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info.
Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)). Robins alleged that Spokeo falsely
reported his educational background, his employment history, his wealth level, and
his marital status, while also publishing a photograph of somebody else under
Robins’s name. ER40:8 ¶¶ 31-32. Robins further alleged that when Spokeo created
1

Robins’s complaint also alleged violations of other FCRA requirements,
including that Spokeo failed to provide required notices to various furnishers and
users of its information, and that it failed to provide a required toll-free number
that consumers can call to request free copies of their credit reports. ER40:12 ¶¶
61-74 (relying on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(d)(1)(A), (B); 1681b(b); 1681j(a)(1)(C)(i)).
But Robins does not pursue these “claims” as independent bases for relief. While
inartfully styled as “claims,” these allegations are merely examples of Spokeo’s
willful failure to use reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy
in its published reports. Because Robins alleges a single claim for relief under
Section 1681e(b), the question of whether such allegations would be independently
sufficient to establish Article III injury is not presented.
2
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the report, it was aware of rampant inadequacies in its processes, was aware of its
consistent failure to follow the procedures the FCRA requires, and, as a result, had
willfully violated the FCRA. ER40:5 ¶22–6 ¶25, ER40:13 ¶ 64.
II.

The Supreme Court’s Decision
The district court dismissed Robin’s action for lack of Article III standing.

This Court reversed. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (2014). This Court held
that Robins’s allegations regarding Spokeo’s willful failure to follow reasonable
procedures established injury in fact because Robins alleged that Spokeo had
“violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” id. at
413, and the “interests protected by the statutory rights at issue are sufficiently
concrete and particularized that Congress can elevate them,” id. (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The Court reiterated that Article III requires the plaintiff to
show he has “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete
and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id.
at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (1992)). Though the Supreme Court took
no issue with this Court’s determination that Robins had alleged a “particularized”
violation of his FCRA rights, it concluded that this Court’s ruling had “elided”
Article III’s independent “concreteness” requirement. Id.

3
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For an injury to be concrete, the Court explained, it must be “‘real,’ and not
‘abstract.’” Id. (citations omitted). But an injury can be “real” even if it is not
“‘tangible.’” Id. at 1549. “In determining whether an intangible harm,” such as one
that may result from the violation of federal statute, “constitutes injury in fact, both
history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Id.

The Court

affirmed that “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet
minimum Article III requirements,” id., and has the power to “define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before,” id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)). Likewise, “[b]ecause the doctrine of
standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that
requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider
whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts.” Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-77 (2000)).
On the other hand, a plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-infact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports
to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. “Robins could not,” the
Court explained, “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete

4
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harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. (citing Summers
v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572). There
must be at least “the risk of real harm” to the interest protected by Congress to
“satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)). But the Court was clear that “the violation of a procedural
right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury
in fact” and, in those circumstances when it is, a plaintiff “need not allege any
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. at 1549-50 (citing
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).
Applied to the case at bar, the Court held that Congress, through the FCRA,
“plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting
procedures designed to decrease that risk.” Id. at 1550. Yet it also recognized that a
procedural violation may not result in a concrete injury because “[a] violation of
one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Id. That might
be the case, the Court suggested, if Spokeo’s poor procedures had not actually led
to any inaccuracy, or if the flawed information published as a result of Spokeo’s
poor procedures did not involve the “types of false information” (like a wrong zip
code) that could “cause harm or present any material risk of harm” to consumers.
Id. & n.8.

5
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Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to
explain why the ruling remained faithful to Article III’s common-law tradition.
The Court’s decision, he wrote, adhered to the traditional distinction between
public and private rights that “persist[ed] in modern standing doctrine.” Id. at
1553-54 (Thomas, J., concurring). “Historically, common-law courts possessed
broad power to adjudicate suits involving the alleged violation of private rights”—
that is, “rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals”—“even when
plaintiffs alleged only the violation of those rights and nothing more.” Id. at 1551
(citation omitted). “Common-law courts, however, have required a further showing
of injury for violation of public rights—rights that involve duties owed to the
whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.”
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In such common-law disputes, Justice
Thomas explained, the plaintiff needed to “allege ‘special damage’” before “the
suit could proceed.” Id. at 1551-52.
Hewing to that tradition, Article III does not require a “plaintiff seeking to
vindicate a statutorily created private right” to “allege actual harm beyond the
invasion of that private right.” Id. at 1553 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982); Tenn. Valley Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
137-38 (1939)). But Article III requires more when the suit involves a public right.
See id. (“Congress cannot authorize private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in

6
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their own names, absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete
harm particular to him.”). Justice Thomas agreed that remand was the appropriate
course because while some of Robins’s allegations invoked public rights, “one
claim in Robins’ complaint rests on a statutory provision that could arguably
establish a private cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held
right.” Id. Thus, if the FCRA “has created a private duty owed personally to
Robins to protect his information, then the violation of the legal duty suffices for
Article III injury in fact.” Id. at 1554.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Sotomayor, “agree[d] with
much of the Court’s opinion,” but dissented because she did not see “the necessity
of a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized injury was ‘concrete’”
because “Robins’ allegations carry him across the threshold.” Id. at 1554-55
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “Robins complains of misinformation about his
education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate representations that
could affect his fortune in the job market.” Id. at 1556. In her view, “[t]he FCRA’s
procedural requirements aimed to prevent such harm.” Id. (citing 115 Cong. Rec.
2410-2415 (1969)).

7

Case: 11-56843, 07/11/2016, ID: 10046531, DktEntry: 76, Page 15 of 37

ARGUMENT
The particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of
risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. “The FCRA seeks to ensure
‘fair and accurate credit reporting.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)(1)). It does so, in part, by providing that “[w]henever a consumer
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures
to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual
about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Any consumer reporting
agency that “fails to comply with” this requirement “with respect to any consumer
is liable to that consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Whether the FCRA is analyzed
as a matter of legislative judgment, under the common law, or both, Congress’s
decision “to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures
designed to decrease that risk,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550, satisfies the
concreteness requirement of Article III.
Nor does Spokeo have any other legitimate basis for contesting Robins’s
Article III standing. Robins has alleged that the inaccuracies in his credit report are
traceable to Spokeo’s willful failure to comply with the FCRA’s procedural duties.
And, the statutory damages to which Robins is entitled if he prevails in this action
provide a judicial remedy. Accordingly, Article III is no obstacle to hearing this
dispute in federal court.

8
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Finally, there are no other issues for this Court to resolve. Although Spokeo
unsuccessfully asserted additional reasons for dismissal in the district court, it did
not raise those arguments as alternative grounds for affirmance in the initial appeal
to this Court. Those arguments were forfeited. The fact this case is on remand from
the Supreme Court changes nothing. The Court should reverse the district court’s
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
I.

The Procedural Violations Robins Alleges Entail a Degree of Risk to
Congress’s Interest in Fair and Accurate Credit Reports Sufficient to
Meet the Concreteness Requirement.
The Supreme Court established a two-part framework for assessing whether

Spokeo’s violation of the FCRA has caused Robins concrete harm. First, this Court
must determine whether the “intangible” interest to which Congress gave statutory
protection is concrete. In fashioning this inquiry, the Court expressly rejected
Spokeo’s argument that concreteness turns on whether the statutory violation
causes a resultant real-world harm. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Church v.
Accretive Health, Inc, No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *2 (11th Cir. July 6,
2016) (recognizing Spokeo held “that an injury need not be tangible to be
concrete”). Rather, that inquiry turns (as it always has) on whether the “legally
protected interest,” i.e., the statutory right, is concrete. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548
(emphasis added) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see, e.g., In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litig., --- F.3d ---, No. 15-1441, 2016 WL 3513782, at *7 (3d

9
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Cir. June 27, 2016) (analyzing Spokeo and concluding that “[w]hile perhaps
‘intangible,’ the harm” at issue “is also concrete in the sense that it involves a clear
de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information”).
Here, the FCRA protects a consumer’s concrete interest in an accurate credit report
about himself or herself.
Second, because the FCRA imposes a procedural obligation, the Court must
ensure that Robins has not alleged “a bare procedural violation” that is “divorced”
from the substantive interest Congress protected. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. In
answering that question, the focus must be on both the nature of the “procedural
violation” and the “types of false information” alleged. Id. at 1550 & n.8. Here,
Robins has suffered concrete harm because he alleges that Spokeo committed
rampant and persistent procedural violations that led to the dissemination of the
types of false information about him that create a “material risk of harm” to the
interest the FCRA protects. Id. at 1550. No more is required to establish injury in
fact under Article III.
Last, the Court explained that this inquiry is especially easy if the statute
“has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. at 1549 (citing Vt. Agency
of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775-77). That is the case here. The interest protected by
Congress is a direct descendant of the interests guarded by the traditional torts of

10
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libel and slander in one’s profession, each of which was actionable per se at
common law. Indeed, until the FCRA, inaccuracies in credit reports could be
remedied, if at all, through an action for defamation under state law. Because the
FCRA protects an intangible interest with a “close relationship” to a harm that,
historically, authorized a suit at common law, the statutory interest is concrete for
purposes of Article III.
A.

Congress’s judgment that the dissemination of false credit reports
harms the subjects of those reports establishes that Robins alleges
a concrete injury.

Congress, on the basis of an exhaustive record, concluded that inaccurate
credit reports caused significant harm both individually and in the aggregate.
Individuals, for instance, experienced diminished job prospects and could have
difficulty securing private financing; in the aggregate, widespread inaccuracies
significantly disrupted credit markets. Judging the problem to be both severe and
solvable, Congress, through the FCRA, adopted a series of reforms designed to
reduce such inaccuracies to the maximum extent feasible and to hold consumer
reporting agencies responsible. Specifically, the statute holds those agencies that
fail to follow proper procedures liable to those consumers about whom they
disseminate false information.
Congress has created a concrete statutory right. Accordingly, the plaintiff
“need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”

11
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Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549-50; see id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A
plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily create private right need not allege actual
harm beyond the invasion of that private right.”). As the Eleventh Circuit just
recently reiterated, it is settled law that “[a]n injury-in-fact, as required by Article
III, ‘may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.’” Church, 2016 WL 3611542, at *3 (quoting Havens
Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373).
Further, Robins does not allege a bare procedural violation divorced from
the harm to which the FCRA responds. Robins alleges that Spokeo committed
serial procedural violations and that it published inaccurate information about,
among other things, his age, family status, employment history, financial status,
and educational attainment. These categories of false information are similar in
type to information that numerous investigative studies have found is pervasively
inaccurate on Spokeo.com. And while Spokeo is aware of these inaccuracies, it
persists in creating and marketing reports about individuals. In short, “[t]he facts
that Robins pled make it plausible that Spokeo acted in reckless disregard of duties
created by the FCRA.” Robins, 742 F.3d at 411 n.1. It is beyond doubt, then, that
the harm resulting from the procedural violations alleged here is directly tethered
to the underlying interest protected by the FCRA.

12
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1.

Congress enacted the FCRA to curb the dissemination of
false credit reports.

The FCRA’s passage was preceded by decades of concern over inadequate
protections against false statements regarding an individual’s creditworthiness.
Historically, the dissemination of a false credit report could be redressed through a
common-law defamation action. See infra at I.B. By the early twentieth century,
though, most American jurisdictions had adopted a “qualified privilege” for
consumer reporting agencies accused of defamation. See Virginia G. Maurer,
Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 Geo. L.J. 95, 100
(1983). The effect of this privilege was to “place the burden of proving actual
malice and actual damages on the plaintiff.” Id. As a consequence, by the midtwentieth century an individual who was “the subject of a credit report [was] all
but unprotected in most jurisdictions.” 115 Cong. Rec. 2414 (1969).
The vulnerability of consumers to false credit reports became a national
concern in the wake of World War II when “a vast credit reporting industry . . .
developed to supply credit information.” S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 2 (1969). Credit
bureaus, aided by “the growth of computer technology,” began to supply
information on millions of individuals’ “financial status, bill paying record and
items of public record such as arrests, suits, judgments,” as well as “information on
a person’s character, habits, and morals,” and “highly sensitive and personal
information about a person’s private life, such as racial or ethnic descent, domestic
13
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trouble, housekeeping habits, and conditions of yard.” Id. at 2, 4. By the 1960s,
there was a consensus in Congress that the States had failed to adapt their
regulatory approach to the modern credit industry. Because “unfair credit reporting
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued
functioning of the banking system,” Congress felt it needed to step in order “to
insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with
fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681(a)(1), (a)(4).
The FCRA was Congress’s measured response. At the behest of the credit
industry, the FCRA preempted most state-law claims by prohibiting “any action or
proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with
respect to the reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency …
based on information disclosed pursuant to [the FCRA], except as to false
information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.” Id.
§ 1681h(a); id. § 1681t(a) (preempting any law “inconsistent with any provision of
this title”); S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 3 (1969) (noting that credit agencies facing the
possibility of new regulations in 29 states “expressed a preference for Federal
regulation rather than State legislation”). Congress also declined to make consumer
reporting agencies strictly liable for the dissemination of false credit reports—as it
could have done. See S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 43 (1995).
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Congress instead “federalized and transformed” “common law defamation in
the credit reporting context . . . into an action for negligence.” Maurer, supra, at
115. Congress did so by training its focus on the procedures consumer reporting
agencies used to ensure accuracy of the reports they disseminate. Specifically, the
FCRA protects the consumer’s interest in an accurate credit report by making
“consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs
of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a
manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Congress recognized that “the consumer reporting system
handles almost two billion pieces of data per month and will never be perfectly
accurate.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 43. Requiring consumer reporting agencies to
adopt certain prophylactic and corrective measures designed to limit inaccuracies
to the extent possible would appropriately “balance the rights of consumers with
those of consumer reporting agencies[.]” Id. at 49.
To that end, the FCRA makes a consumer reporting agency that is “negligent
in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under [the act] with respect to
any consumer . . . liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any
actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure[.]” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681o(a). And it makes a consumer reporting agency that “willfully fails to
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comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any
consumer is liable to that consumer” for “any actual damages sustained by the
consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more
than $1,000.” Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). In other words, Congress distinguished
between those consumer reporting agencies that acted negligently and those that
acted willfully—making enhanced statutory remedies available only with respect
to the latter.
Indeed, Congress’s decision to allow for statutory damages was the result of
careful deliberation. Before the FCRA allowed statutory damages, the law did “not
always serve as a viable remedy.” Lawrence D. Frenzel, Fair Credit Reporting
Act: The Case for Revision, 10 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 409, 429 (1977). “Civil actions
brought pursuant to the [FCRA] tend[ed] to result in nominal—if any—damages to
the consumer-plaintiff.” Id. at 429-30. Accordingly, there was “little incentive on
the part of the consumer to bring an action under the statute, and as a result,
reporting agencies [felt] no real compulsion to comply with the protective
mechanisms of the Act.” Id. at 430. There were numerous calls to amend the
FCRA to “provid[e] for minimum liability or presumed damages when a violation
is proven.” Robert R. Stauffer, Note, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening
Services and the Right to Privacy, 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 239, 311 (1987); see also
Consumer Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
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Comm. on Banking, Currency, and Hous., 94th Cong., 6, 79, 105-06 (1975).
Congress thus responded to “horror stories about inaccurate credit information and
the inability of consumers to get the information corrected,” 141 Cong. Rec.
10,916 (1995), by amending the FCRA to allow victims of willful violations to
recover statutory damages. Congress understood that although harm was almost
certain to occur from willful violations of the FCRA, it was “very difficult to
prove.” Consumer Information, supra, at 6.
In the end, Congress was “aware of concerns expressed by furnishers of
information and the consumer reporting agencies that these provisions will result in
unwarranted litigation,” but believed this step was necessary to protect “consumers
who have been wronged.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 49. That was Congress’s choice
to make. See, e.g., Church, 2016 WL 3611542, at *3 (recognizing that Congress
may create “a new right” and thus “a new injury”). Congress did all that Article III
requires of it. Congress “related the injury” (i.e., invasion of a consumer’s legal
right to accurate information in his credit report) “to the class of persons entitled to
bring suit” (i.e., those individuals whose inaccurate reports are the product of the
consumer reporting agency’s failure to follow reasonable procedures). Lujan, 504
U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Congress’s “judgment is . . . instructive and important” and, accordingly, is entitled
to judicial respect. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
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2.

Robins has not alleged a bare procedural violation divorced
from the FCRA’s interest in curbing the dissemination of
false credit reports.

Robins is not “alleging a bare procedural violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at
1550. His complaint alleges Spokeo systematically failed to use reasonable
procedures, and that its failure to do so when preparing his report rendered his
profile inaccurate in important respects. “Robins pled, among other things, that
Spokeo knew about inaccuracies in its reports and marketed its reports for
purposes covered by the FCRA despite disclaiming any such uses.” Robins, 742
F.3d at 411 n.1. Indeed, “Spokeo’s founder—Harrison Tang—gave a statement
regarding purported inaccuracies in [the agency’s] consumer reports. According to
Tang, ‘We know there are a lot of things we need to improve. There are algorithms
we can do that we haven’t had time to improve the inaccuracies. There’s a lot of
holes. We know that and we admit that.’” ER40:6 ¶ 23.
In addition, “Spokeo has failed to develop an effective system to allow
consumers to remove inaccurate information from their individual reports, or
remove the reports from Defendant's website altogether.” Id. ¶ 24. For example,
“while [Spokeo] purports to allow individuals to remove their Spokeo listings,
Spokeo intentionally limits removal requests based on unspecified or nonexistent
criteria. Specifically, Spokeo frequently responds to individuals who attempt to
remove information that: ‘In order to prevent abuse, we must limit the frequency of
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privacy requests. Please try again tomorrow. Government officials please use your
@.gov email address for priority processing.” Id. Even when successfully
removed, an inaccurate report can reappear. ER40-1:26 ¶ 33 (Exh. G to FAC). In
sum, “the facts that Robins pled make it plausible that Spokeo acted in reckless
disregard of duties created by the FCRA.” Robins, 742 F.3d at 411 n.1.
Moreover, Robins does not allege that these rampant procedural violations,
led, for example, merely to trivial inaccuracies. Quite the contrary, the “types of
false information” alleged here, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct at 1550 n.8, create a “risk of real
harm” to the subjects of credit reports, id. at 1549. Again, Robins alleged that
Spokeo disseminated a false report about him that misrepresented his age, marital
status, earnings history, employment circumstances, and physical appearance.
Inaccuracies in these categories of information creates a substantial risk that his
employment prospects will be negatively affected. Employers may decide not to
pursue a candidate they believe is overqualified, has a high salary expectation, or
may have family commitments preventing the candidate from accepting the
relevant responsibilities; nor may they be inclined to pursue candidates whose
reports vary from the (accurate) information the applicant might himself provide
the employer. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Spokeo’s
misrepresentation of Robins’s marital status also creates a real risk of harm,
especially given Spokeo’s promotion of its service for use by prospective romantic
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partners. 136 S. Ct. at 1546; see Vanessa Flores Waite, When Your Gut Feeling
Says He’s Married, Spokeo Blog, http://www.spokeo.com/blog/2016/07/whenyour-gut-feeling-says-hes-married (July 7, 2016).
“The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to prevent such harm.”
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–
2415 (1969)). The FCRA responded to the “horror stories about inaccurate credit
information and the inability of consumers to get the information corrected.” 141
Cong. Rec. 10,916. Congress recognized that agencies “frequently confuse[d] one
individual with another” and reproduced “[b]iased information” and “malicious
gossip and hearsay.” 115 Cong. Rec. at 2411. Put differently, the types of
inaccuracies at issue in this case create a “material risk of harm” to the interests the
FCRA protects and typify the “chain[] of causation” Congress had in mind when it
enacted the statute. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citation omitted). The harm Robins
alleges is therefore concrete.
B.

The FCRA’s protection against the dissemination of false credit
reports follows from the common law.

History, too, is on Robins’s side. As noted above, it “is instructive to
consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that
has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Indeed, it can be “well nigh
conclusive with respect” to the Article III inquiry. Vt. Agency of Natural
20
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Resources, 529 U.S. at 777. Here, a “close relationship” exists between the
dissemination of false credit reports and common-law defamation. Long before the
FCRA, a common-law defamation action could be brought against a credit agency
for disseminating false information. See Maurer, supra, at 97; William T. Prosser,
Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 842-43 (1960). That close relationship is
sufficient to resolve the Article III question. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v.
APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-85 (2008).
Defamation has a long common-law lineage. See Van Vechten Veeder,
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 546, 549-69
(1903). Two species of defamation law are particularly relevant here: written
defamation (or libel), and slander of an individual in his profession. Originally, one
key limitation on the ability of a plaintiff to recover in an action for defamation
was the requirement that the plaintiff prove a “temporal loss,” or actual damages,
arising from the disparaging statement. See, e.g., Bernard v. Beale, (1617) 79 Eng.
Rep. 1241 (K.B.).
Over time, however, the common law developed such that, for some
defamation claims, harm was presumed even in the absence of proof. Harm was
presumed, for instance, for claims of slander that “touch[ed]” the plaintiff “in his
profession.” Jenkins v. Smith, (1620) 79 Eng. Rep. 501 (K.B.). And once English
common law courts began to distinguish between written and spoken defamation,
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“all libel, of whatever kind, was held to be actionable without proof of any
damage; or, as it was sometimes stated, from any libel some damage was
conclusively presumed.” Prosser, Libel, supra, at 842 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
R v. Langley, (1702) 90 Eng. Rep. 1261 (K.B.). By 1812, the distinction permitting
recovery for any libel had “been recognized by the Courts for at least a century
back.” Thorley v. Lord Kerry, (1812) 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (K.B.).
These common-law rules—permitting courts to hear claims for all libel, as
well as for any defamation touching upon trade or business, without proof of
consequential harm—were adopted in America as well. Blackstone noted, for
example, that for certain categories of slander, including “scandalous words that
. . . may impair [a man’s] trade . . . an action may be had, without proving any
particular damage to have happened, but merely upon the probability that it might
happen.” Blackstone, 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *124; see 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 16 (1827). Early
American decisions thus applied the English common-law rule that general
damages were permissible for any statement that touched upon the trade or credit
of those engaged in business. See Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. App. 227,
232 (1885); Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540, 542 (1859); Newbold v. J.M.
Bradstreet & Son, 57 Md. 38, 52-53 (1881); Dun v. Maier, 82 F. 169, 173 (5th Cir.
1897). A showing of consequential harm was unnecessary because this kind of
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false statement “necessarily or naturally and presumptively causes pecuniary loss
to the person of whom it is published.” Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 22 S.W. 358,
362 (Mo. 1893). Early American courts also evidenced widespread acceptance of
the established principle that general damages, without proof of consequential
harm, were available in all libel cases. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 228
(1875) (“[M]any things are actionable when written or printed and published which
would not be actionable if merely spoken, without averring and proving special
damage.”); see, e.g., Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (Pa. 1803); McClurg v. Ross, 5
Binn. 218 (Pa. 1812); Norfolk & Wash. Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D.C. 306,
331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1898).
In sum, Anglo-American common law has long permitted claims by those
who, like Robins, were the subject of false and defamatory reports, particularly
reports that had the potential to harm their standing, credit, trade, or business. Such
claims were actionable absent “evidence of actual loss,” Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974), because the “experience and judgment of history”
is “‘that proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many [defamation]
cases’” even though “‘it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.’”
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (quoting W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 112 (4th ed. 1971)). Hence, “the existence of injury is
presumed from the fact of publication.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
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The FCRA follows directly from this common-law tradition. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized that “the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort
victims,” including victims of “libel” and “slander per se,” “even if their harms
may be difficult to prove or measure.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing
Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 569, 570 (1938)). That is what the FCRA does. It
allows the subject of a credit report to recover when a consumer reporting agency
disseminates false information about him. Like the common law, the FCRA makes
such false dissemination actionable because it is likely to “deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, even if “no
proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant’s attack upon the
plaintiff’s character and reputation,” id. § 620 cmt. a. By making this intangible
harm actionable, the FCRA is “consonant with what was, generally speaking, the
business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).2
2

Congress’s decision to afford certain victims of false credit reports statutory
damages has additional historical support. See Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on
the Measure of Damages 571 (1847) (describing the “large class of cases” where
legislatures “endeavored to put a stop to all inquiry into the actual damages by
fixing an arbitrary sum as the measure of relief”). In 1790, for example, the First
Congress required copyright infringers to “pay the sum of fifty cents for every
sheet,” half to the owner and half to the government; no proof of actual loss was
required. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-125.
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But even if the FCRA deviates from the common law in some way, there is a
sufficiently “close relationship” to satisfy the concreteness requirement. Spokeo,
136 S. Ct. at 1549. After all, the Article III question is not whether Robins could
have successfully sued Spokeo for defamation in the late eighteenth century, but
whether the FCRA authorizes an action “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and
resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (emphasis added) (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 356-57 (1911)). If “Congress can create new private rights and authorize
private plaintiffs to sue based simply on violation of those new legal rights,”
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring), it certainly has the power to
update the common law to the modern era. Congress is not so constrained that it
may protect rights derived from the common law only when it accepts them in
their fossilized form. Whether or not the FCRA perfectly “duplicate[s] the
recovery at common law” it provides “a reasonably just substitute for the commonlaw or state tort law remedies it” partially “replaces.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978).
II.

Robins meets the other requirements of Article III standing.
Because Robins has suffered injury in fact, he has Article III standing.

Neither the Supreme Court nor Spokeo has questioned that the injury alleged by
Robins “is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and “will be
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redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). And for good reason. Robins, 742 F.3d
at 414. As to traceability, Robins need not “establish”—let alone plead—“with any
certainty” that the credit report created about him would have been accurate had
Spokeo followed proper procedures. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a
procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had
received the procedure the substantive result would have been altered.”) (citations
and quotations omitted). Instead, Robins need only allege that the missing
“procedural step was connected to the substantive result.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
at 518. As explained above, he has. And as to redressability, the FCRA affords
Robins statutory damages, “which redress the violation of statutory rights.” Robins,
742 F.3d at 414.
III.

There Are No Other Issues Before This Court.
In the district court, Spokeo pressed for dismissal on the additional ground

that Robins failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ER22:15. In
particular, Spokeo argued that it is not a “consumer reporting agency” within the
meaning of the FCRA and that it is immune under the Communications Decency
Act. ER22:15, 21. The district court rejected both arguments. ER52:4-5. On
appeal, the parties litigated only the issue of Robins’s Article III standing; Spokeo
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declined to defend the judgment on alternative grounds. Robins, 742 F.3d at 414
n.4 (noting that “standing is the only question before us”).
Thus, no issues beyond whether Robins suffered a concrete injury in fact are
before this Court on remand. It was Spokeo’s duty to raise these arguments in
defense of the district court’s judgment. Its failure to do so renders them forfeited.
See, e.g., City of Thousand Oaks v. Verizon Media Ventures, Inc., 69 F. App’x 826,
828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Appellees waived their argument that the transaction violated
section 4.2 by failing to raise it as an alternative ground for affirmance in their
opening brief on appeal.”) (citing United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 817
n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Nor does the fact that the case is on remand from the Supreme
Court afford Spokeo a second bite at the apple. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 820 F.3d
1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Nw. Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 470
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the
case for further proceedings.
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